

Module 7: Implications for Intel

Network Enabled Command and Control
Short Course

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Questions Addressed

- What is meant by the term “Intelligence”?
- How are Intel and C² related?
- What are the characteristics of Industrial Age approaches and practices?
- What are the implications of NEC for Intel?
- How does Intel need to adapt to be able to support Complex Endeavors?

What is meant by the term “Intelligence”?

- Intelligence refers to the collection, analysis and the production of products related to the development of situation awareness and understanding of all aspects of the situation with the exception of “Blue” intentions and capabilities
- This includes
 - adversary capabilities
 - adversary intentions
 - environmental conditions
- Many, but not all, of the sensors and other sources of information employed are classified

C² and Intel

- C² and Intel are intimately related – C2I, C3I, C4ISR
- Intel supports Command and Control by being a major contributor to the development of situation awareness
- Analogous to C², the functions of Intel can be approached in a variety of ways as a function of
 - Decisions Rights
 - Patterns of Interaction
 - Distribution of Information (“raw” Intel and Intel products)

Industrial Age Intelligence Practices

- The practice of Intel exhibits the characteristics of a De-conflicted approach
- Decision rights have traditionally been closely held
 - between within various “means”
 - within nations (between agencies)
 - across nations countries
- Patterns of interaction have been tightly constrained
 - follows chain of command
 - determined by established processes
- Distribution of information has been carefully limited
 - distribution tied to chain of command
 - need to know
 - protection of sources and methods

Information Ownership is still widely practiced in the Intel Community

Failures of Industrial Age Intel

- Pearl Harbor
 - Army and Navy Intelligence separate, no exchange of information
 - Warning not distributed to all commands
- 9/11
 - Legal barriers to sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies
 - Failure to share information
 - Failure to collaborate on analysis
- Battle of the Bulge
 - See following slides

WWII Intel: Battle of the Bulge

World War II Era Intel was characterized by

- Intelligence flows tied directly to the chain of command
 - Each echelon decided what to pass to superiors
 - Senior echelon judgment considered final
 - No lateral communications
- Need to know principle dominant, particularly for ULTRA intercepts
- No collaboration mechanisms except face to face
 - Dominated by commanders
 - Intelligence organizations typically excluded

The Dots Not Connected: ULTRA Intercepts

- Hitler boasting of a force for a large scale attack to the west
- SS Units on the Western Front reassigned to a new Sixth Panzer Army
- Signals identifying 400+ trains to the Ardennes front
- German Air Force deploying west to protect the Ardennes front
- Requests for aerial reconnaissance of the area behind the Allies in the Ardennes
- Sudden radio silence shortly before the attack – a major indicator of new operations.

More Dots Not Connected

- Air Reconnaissance reported heavy rail movements moving toward the Ardennes
- SHAEF Intelligence notes the disappearance of the 5th Panzer Army from the line and creation of the 6th Panzer Army
- Patton (3rd US Army) notes failure of Germans to counter-attack in the Saar, violating their doctrine
- American 28th Division in the Ardennes reports heavy engine and horse drawn vehicle sounds
- American 106th Infantry Division reports sounds of major enemy movements in their front
- Captured soldiers report a major offensive imminent

Some Foresaw the Attack

- GEN Patton (3rd Army) concluded on December 7 an attack was coming and reported it, but the conclusion was rejected by Bradley's (12th Army Group) intelligence section
- First Army (GEN Hodges) G-2 concluded on December 14 that an attack was coming in the Ardennes. He was ignored in his own command
- No alerts were issued
- On December 15 the attack was launched directly into First Army, which was totally surprised

Battle of the Bulge: What if?

- Had the warning dots been connected – forces assembled, logistics preparation, reconnaissance efforts, prisoner reports, sounds of preparation – surprise could have been avoided, preparations made
- Had intelligence organizations been collaborating those who saw the attack coming might have persuaded others
- Had intelligence information been shared horizontally as well as vertically, the quality of awareness and shared awareness would have improved.

What if?

- What if the Dots were connected for:
 - Pearl Harbor?
 - 9/11 ?

Current Intelligence Practices

- Current practices to Intel reflect a “Coordinated” approach
 - Decision Rights are often shared for selected purposes
 - Patterns of interaction are usually limited to the functions and activities being coordinated
 - Decision Rights and the nature of permitted interactions are usually negotiated for a particular purpose
 - Interactions are usually restricted to specific, agreed channels
 - Distribution of information is usually constrained to partner agencies and governments
 - Priority is given to protecting sources and methods

Extent of sharing depends on pre-existing levels of trust

Information Age Intel: JIATF South

- Multinational “Self”: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Ecuador, Netherlands, Peru, Spain, UK, and U.S.
- Interagency: CIA, Coast Guard, Customs and Border patrol, DEA, DIA, DoD, FBI, ICE, NSA, and NGA
- Conducts training, surveillance, tracking, interdiction (seizures and arrests), prosecutions
- Twenty years to build interoperability, create trust, and develop collaboration mechanisms
- However, interactions with Mexico are limited to liaison and cooperation

Example Operation: JAITF South

- U.S. Customs and Border Patrol P-3 detected an SPSS) Self-Propelled, Semi-Submersible (July 16, 2008)
- JAITF South tracks the SPSS and sees it headed for Mexican waters
- Mexican officials alerted by JAITF South
- Mexican Navy vessels and helicopters interdicted the vessel in international waters
- Six tons of cocaine seized, several arrests made

Information Age Intel: Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- Broadly distributed – 100+ U.S. locations
- Multi-agency
 - Federal (FBI plus Intelligence community)
 - State and local police organizations
- Focus on lowering classification of relevant reporting
 - Distribution to all concerned
 - Frequent use of collaboration

Example Operations: JTTF

- Arrest of six Yemeni-Americans for “material” support to Al Qaeda (New York, 2002)
- Arrest of Muslim-Americans for conspiring to join Al Qaeda (Oregon, 2002)
- Arrest of five men plotting an armed attack on FT Dix (New Jersey, 2007)
- Breakup of a cell planning to bomb synagogues and use Stinger missiles against Air National Guard (New York, 2009)
- Prevention of bombing of the federal building in Springfield (Illinois, 2009)

Information Age: U.S.-Mexico Border Control

- Developed over time
 - Cooperation in counter-narcotics began (1973)
 - First bi-national counter-drug strategy (1998)
 - Little information sharing
 - Operations conducted independently
 - President Calderon made battling drug lords a national priority (2006)
 - U.S. recognizes drugs coming north and arms and cash going south form a dangerous market, agrees to work on both (April 2009)

Example Recent Operations: U.S.-Mexican Border

- Mexico seizes 630 kilos of cocaine using non-intrusive screening equipment and training by United States at airport (May 2009)
- United States seizes \$200,000 at border in Texas—first southbound seizure (May 2009)
- United States seizes \$302,000 in Texas (May 2009)
- United States raids on Mexican drug networks in the United States, based partly on intelligence from Mexico, result in more than 200 arrests (October 2009)